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Bernstein and Shah provide an empirical frame-  consumption allowances were cost-effective. In
work for assessing the effects of tax policy on an  Mexico, neither investment tax credits nor
array of producer decisions about output supplies  accelerated capital consumption allowances were
and input demands in Mexico, Pakistan, and  cost-effective. In contrast, in Pakistan, both
Turkey. They specify and estimate a dynamic  investment tax credits and accelerated capital
production structure model with imperfect  consumption allowances were cost-effective. In
competition for selected industries in these  the intermediate run, defined as tax policy
countries.  impact after one year, only the investmnent
allowances and arxeicra!zd capital consumption
The model results suggest that tax policy  allowances available to Turkish industries
affected production and invcstinent and further  proved cost-effective.
that selective tax incentives such as investmcnt
tax credits, investment allowances, and acceler-  To make selective tax incentives more
ated capital consumption (depreciation) allow-  effective, investment tax credits must be refund-
ances are more cost-cffective at promoting  able and carrying forward investment and
investment than morc general tax incentives such  depreciation allowances must be permitted. If
as corporate tax ratc reductions. The long-run  stimulating investment expenditure is the sole
cost-effectiveness of these incentives - except  objective of tax policy, reducing the corporate
corporate tax rate reductions, which proved cost-  tax rate is not a cost-effective instrument to
ineffective in all cases --  varies by country. In  achieve this objective.
Turkey, investment allowances and capital
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Serics  disseminates  thc  findings  of work  under  way  in the  Bank.  An objective  of the series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fuilly  polished. The findings.  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  reprcsent  official  Bank policy.
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1.0  INTRODUCTION
Fiscal incentives  for investment  promotion  are prevalent  in most developing  countries.
The effectiveness  of these instruments  in meeting  stated  policy goals is an important  area of
public  policy  concern  yet rigorous  developing  country  empirical  evidence  to guide  policy  in this
as  is almost  eomp.etely  lacldng. To address  these  concerns,  in the past, policy makers  relied
on opinion survey of firms (see for e&.ample,  Guisinger  and Associates,  1985), and more
rceently,  on marginal  effective  tax rate analysis  (see for example  Boadway  and Shah, 1992).
However,  none  of these approaches  is able to analyze  the effects  of tax policy changes  on the
strtvcre  of production and the rate of capital accumulation.
This  paper develops  and estimates  a dynamic  model  of production  to examine  tax effects
on an array of produc+ion  decisions  regarding  inputs and ov;tput  for six industries  in three
developing  countries  narnely  Mexico,  Pakistan  and Turkey.  The paper evaluates  investment  tax
credits, investment  tax allowances,  capital cost allowances  and corporate income taxes as
instruments  for investment  promotion.  Under  an investment  tax credit  corporations  are allowed
to deduct  against  their tax liabilities  a fraction  of expenditures  on new additions  to physical
capital stock.  Tax credits provide  a direct subsidy to such activities.  An investment  tax
allowance allows a  deduction from taxable income based on  a  fraction of  investment
expenditures.  Capital  cost  allowances  permit  depreciation  for tax purposes  as a deduction  from
taxable  income. Corporate  income  tax reductions  permit  a lower rate of taxation  on corporate
income.  The paper is organized into the following sections.  Section 1.1 presents i!lustrative
calculations  on the post-tax cost of capital expenditures  under altemate tax policy provisions and
a history  of tax changes  in three  countries. Section  1.2  presents  the theoretical  model. Section1.3 specifies  the empirical  framework  and derives  relevant  elasticity  formulate.  Section 1.4
discusms  the impact  of tax  policy  on investment  and government  revenues. Sections  1.5 through
1.7 prest  the empirical  results  for selected  industries  in thl sample  countries. A final  section
summarizes  thesm  results.
1.1  COST OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
Four tax instruments  that affect  the purchase  prices  of capital  stocks  are considered  here
namely;  the corporate  income  tax rate, the allowed  depreciation  rate, investment  allowance  and
investment  tax credit  rate. To see the effects  of tax policy  on the after tax or post tax pu-,hase
prices, consider  a machine  that has a price of one unit denominated  in the local currency.
Dealing  first with the allowed  depreciation  rate, suppose  that depreciation  occurs  at an annual
rate of 30%. In addition,  the expenditure  on the machine  must be capitalized  and assume  that
the future depreciation  deductions  are discounted  at the rate of 15%.  The present value  of
depreciation  deductions  based  on declinir.,  balance  depreciation  is, z = d(t + r)/(r + d), where
d is the allowed  depreciation  rate and r is the discount  rate.  Thus the tax deduction  due to
depreciation  is 0.77.
Next consider  the corporate  income  tax rte.  In the present  example  the tax reduction
due to depreciation  equals  0.77u,,  where u is the corporate  income  tax rate and the post tax
cost  of the unit value  of the machine  is 1 - 0.77u,. If the corporate  incon.  S tax rate is 0.46, and
there  is taxable  income,  then  the post  tax cost  is 0.65  and the tax reduction  is 0.35  on a machine
of unit value in the local currency.3 -
It is of interest to compare the tax reduction  due to depreciation  deductions  and the
reduction  due to the immediate  write-off of the machine. In the latter case, assuming  there is
taxable  income,  the tax reduction  is u, Lnd  the post tax cost is 1 - u,.  Hence  with a corpora^e
tax ate of 0.46 the post tax cost is 0.54 and the tax reduction  is 0.46. The tax reduction  in the
depreiaon  deductions  cae  is 23% smaller  than the tax reduction  from immediate  write-off.
Neot, consider  the investment  tax credit. Let the credit rate be v.  The tax reduction
on the unit value  of the machine  is zg,(l -v) +  . There are three aspects  to this tax reduction.
The first, is zum  which  is the depreciation  part. The second  is  *zu v which  is the amount  that
the tax credit  reduces  the depreciation  base. The third  is v which  is the investment  tax credit.
Thus  the post  tax cost  of the unit  value  machine  is 1  -[zU,(l  -v) +v].  If u. is 0.46 and v is 0.10
then the tax reduction  is 0.42 and the post tax cost of the mwchine  is 0.68.
Some countries, for example  Turkey, rather than offring  a  credit for investment
expenditure  allow a fraction  of these expenditures  to be deducted  from taxable  income  in the
year such outlays  are made. This is an investment  tax allowance. Under such a regime, the
post  tax cost  of the unit value  of machine  is 1 - [zu 1 + u0O]. If z =  0.77, u  =  0.46 and #  (the
allowance  rate) - 0.10 then the tax allowance  contributes  0.40 to ax reduction  with the final
cost of the machine  equal  to 0.60.
Table 1.1 shows  examples  of the post tax cost of unit value machinery  and equipment
for three countries;  Mexico,  Pakdstan  and Turkey. The highest  post  tax cost of a unit value  of-4-
Table 1.  1
Cost of a unit value  of capital  expenditure
Thscont
Mexico'  0.46  0.53
Paklstanb  0.43  0.52
Turkeyr  0.46  0.53
Cu,  = 0.42, straightline  depreciation  at 0.10, this is an average  rate, v  =  0.30,
and  z  = 0.811 for r =  0.O5  and z =  0.S77  for r  =  0.15.
-u = 0.55, this includes  the supertax  rate, declning balance  depreciation  at 0.10, v
= 0.30, and z = 0.7 for r  =  0.OS and z = 0.46 for r = J. 15.
'u,  = 0.46, declining  balance  depreciation  at 0.25, investment  allowance  rate -
0.30, this is the minimum  rate allowed  and z - 0.875 for r  - 0.05 and z-
0.719 for r  0  O.  15.-5.
capital expenditure is  found in Turkey, followed by Mexico and I-aldstan.  As  fuure
depreciation  deductions  are discounted  at a higner  rate. their value  diminishes  and the post tax
cost of the expenditure  rises. This can be seen  f:oni the table, as the second  column  figures  are
higher  than those  found  in the first column.
1.2  TAX  STRUCTURE  AND  PRODUCTION:  A DYNAMIC  THEORETICAL  MODEL
The technology  of a representative  firm within  an Mndustry can be defined  as
y, X f(Kv,.,  v,, A14, Aj  (1)
where y is the output  quantity,  K is the m dimensional  vector  of quasi-fixed  factors,  v is the n
dimensional  vector of variable  factors  and A is the indicator  of the level of technology. The
production  function  is denoted  by f, which is defined  for nonnegative  input quantities,  and is
nonnegative  with  positive  marginal  products. The production  function  also  decline.  with  respect
to the net investment vector, AK =  K,  - K,. . Adjustment  costs are represented through the net
investment  vector  in the production  function  and are measured  as foregone  output. The cost of
changing  a quasi-fixed  fac:or  is the loss in output  that could have  been  produced. Adjustment
costs  are, thereby,  internal  to the production  process  (see  for example,  Treadway  [1971,19/4],
Mortensen  (1973]  and EIpstein  (1981]). The subscript  t represents  the time period I
Quasi-fixed  factors are also referred to as capital  inputs. In this model,  capital  inputs
relate to various ypes of plant and equipment. The stocks of the capital  inputs accumulate
according  to
IK  =  + (,a-  5)Kv.,,  (2)where  I is the m dimensional  Investment  vector,  a is an m dimensional  diagonal  matrix  of fixed
depreciation  rates such that Og  s  s 1,  I - 1, ...,  m.  It is assumed  that capital  services  are
proportional  to the capital stocks (see Bernstein  and Nadiri [1988D).l  In addition, I.  is the
dimensional  identity  matrix.
Finns sel their products,  hire or purchase  factors  of producuon,  invest  in captal stocks
and finance  their operations,  such that the flow  of funds  is given  by,
p y, - wsTv_t-Ig + AB,  + P 1 ,&ANst  - r,B, I  - TOt  - D t -0.  (3)
The product  price is denotad  by p, w is the vector of variable  input prices, q is the vector of
capital  purchase  prices, B is the value  of outstanding  bond issues,  AAB  B,  - Bj. is the value
of net bond  issues  (net  of retirements),  p, is the price of shares,  N, is the quantity  of ouuwanding
shares,  AN,, - N, - N.,  are new share  issues, rb  is the interest  rate on bonds, T. aie income
taxes and D is the value  of dividends.
The flow of funds can be further decomposed  by considering  income taxes.  First,
investment  incentives  are often in the form of credits  sucih  that at time t with a credit rate of
O<V,zt,<  -j,...m. the ith capital  stock  investment  tax credit is,
rX,,-V,,qw,I,  iZ,..,  (4)
Second,  there are capital  cost allowances  associated  with the depreciation  of the capital
stocks. In general,  depreciatioz'  deductions  equal  di, on a unit value  of the original  cost of the
ith capital  stock  of age r.  Since  capital  must  be fully  depreciated,  then it must be the case that
E  1,  a  - 1, ...,  m. The capital  cost  allowance  at time  t for the ith capital  stock  installed
1.0
at different  times  is,-7-
CCA 19 *  s  qs 1 , I,.,(l  -,v1,)d,r  ...  m  (5)
'  O0
where 0 5 #,  S 1 is the prportion of the investment  tat credit v.  hih reduces  the depreciztiori
base for tax purposes.
MhMd,  with  sect  to the hbor inputs  there are no payroll  taxes -it with respect  to the
intemediate  inputs  ther are value  added  taxes. Let the tax rate on he  jth variable  input  at time
t be n  <  q,  < 1 and so the post value  added  tax is 2;.  ogw,.  The income  tax is defined  at
ime t by the  rate O < u,, <  1, based  on revenue  net of the post value added  tax cos+ ,f  'the
.able  inputs,  net of inteet  payments,  net of capital  cost allowances  znd net of investment
tax creditsl. Thus income  taxes  at time t are
X  _  uOI(P.We T %-)V-rk,  s-iCW-iUC  + wTt  v  (6)
where  I, is the n dimensional  identity  matrix, (so  is a diagonal  matrix  of value  added  tax rates
(including  payroll tax rates), i  is the m dimensional  identity vector, CCA and ITC are m
dimensional  vectors of  capital cost allowances and investment tax credits respectively.
Substituting  equation  (6) (the income  tax equation)  into the flow of funds equation  (given as
equation  (3), yields,
,Yty  - wT as - p),vj  (I -%)  q;- I  +  i,,(u,,CC-,k  +  lTC,
* [D/(pl..)  + Apr/Pg 1PgNg- 1 + rbt(I - u,)BD,X  (7)
A  (PN)  - ABt8 -
The leP.  side of equation (7) shows revenue  net of tax, net of variable  input cost and tnet  of
investment  expenditures.  The right side  of the equation  shows  the flow  of funds  to bondholders
and shareholders. Equations  (1), (2). and (7) summarize  the technology,  capital  accumulation
and flow  of funds for the representative  firm in the industry.
Turning  to the nature  of market  structure,  the first market  to be considered  is the product
market.  P..oduct  demand  is represented  by
p,UD (Yr,  e,),  (8)
where Y  . M  J is industry  output, with  "he  superscript  repres nting the particular  firm, and
c is a vector of exogenous  variables  affecting  product  demand. The iiverse prod' :t demand
function  is given by D, which is defined for nonnegative  industry  output, nonnegative  and
decreasing  in industry  output. Implied  by the inverse  product  demand  function,  is that firms
within  an industry  produce homogeneou,  products. Moreover,  depending  on the conjectural
relationship  between  the output  of a firm and industry,  the product  market  in the model  can be
competitive,  monopolistic  or oligopolistic  (see Bernstein  and Mohnen  (1991]).
Second,  the variable  and capital  input  markets  are assumed  to be competitive.  Thus  firms
face  exogenous  variable  and quasi-fixed  input  prices. The last set of markets  are the financial
markets. Given  the less developed  nature  of the economy,  firms  are not able  to affeci  the rates
of return on their shares or bonds.  These  rtes  of returns are essentially  constrained  by world
financial  markets. Define  financial  capital  as V, = P,N,  + B, and so AV, = A(p&, 1 )  + AB 1,
then equation  (7) can be rewritten  as
Fe  - [r,, + r,(l  -u,  ) A,_J](I  + 1_,)-'  V,_1  - AV,  (9)9 -
where  F, is the left side  of equation  (7), which  is net after  tax revenue,  the rate of return  on the
shares of a firm isr5 ,  rS.  + ±  , and the leverage ratio is  A, 1 - . The rate of
return  on shares  consists  of the payout  ratio, which  is dividends  per value  of outstanding  shares,
plus  the capital  gains  (or losses)  on the share  prices. The leverage  of a firm is A which  is the
ratio of debt to financial  capital. Define  p as the coefficient  of V,  in equation  (9).  It is the
rate of return  on financial  capital  which  is a weighted  average  of the rates of return on equity
and debt.  It  is assumed that the rte  of return on financial  capital issued by a  firm is
exogenous.
the objective  of a firm is to operate in the interest of its owners by maximizing  the
expected  present  value  of the flow of funds to its shareholders. In the context  of the present
model,  because  the rates  of return  on equity  and debt  capital  are exogenous,  and therefore  cannot
be influenced  by shareholders,  the objective  is equivalent  to maximizing  the expected  present
value of the flow of funds to shareholders and bondholders.  In other words a firm maximizes
the expected  present  value  of financial  capital. The objective  can  be obtained  from  equation  (9).
Solving  for V 1 and applying  the conditional  expectations  operator  yields.
J, -, E  i  a(t,  ) P,y,[Ps  - W,J,  -Qr  I, - " M,J  (10)
where EA  is the expectations  operator  conditional  on 'nformnation  known  at time t, the discount
rate  is the  rate of  return on fancial  capital,  a(t, t) -1,  a(t, t+l)  a (1 + p)-1, p m  p(i  - u) is the
after  tax  product price,  W,  - wt (1 -u;  ) (1 - j ) j - 1,...n are  the  after tax  variable factor
prices, and Q is an m dimensional  vector of after tax capital  stock  purchase  prices,- 10-
Ql, - qi, (1  - V.'  - i  a( t,s + r9)  a( t,s)l  ue,,.,r  (1-I,  d)
s.0
and M is an m dimensional  vector of tax reductions  at time t, due to capital  cost allowances
arising from past investment expenditures, M,  - u,5i  q  , I,  (1 - *11.,v,)d 1,*  At any
time t, M does not affect output  supply  and input  demand  decisions  because  from the vantage
point of the present  the vector is predetermined. A sgnificant feature  of a dynamic  model  is
that current and future talx  rates, cedits  and allowances  are explicitly  accounted  for in the
analysis.  Indeed,  the future  tax  purchase  prices  of the capital  stocks  shows  the array of current
and future  tax policy  instruments  which  affect  the analysis.1
A firm maximizes  the expected  present  value  of the flow of funds (in other words the
right side of equation  (10))  by selecting  output  supply, variable  input and investment  demand
subject  to the production  function  (equation  (1)), capital  accumulation  equations  (equation  (2)),
the inverse  product  demand  function  (equation  (8)), the exogenous  current  and future  after tax
factor prices and discount  rates.  This program  can be solved  in two stages. The first stage
relates to the short run decisions  and the second  stage concerns  the intertemporal  production
choices.  Conditional  on the capital stocks, output supply  and variable factor demand  are
determined. With this solution,  a firm then proceeds  to determine  the demand  for the capital
inputs.  In  breaking the prob.em into two subsets, the first stage solution or  short-run
equilibrium  is found  by maximizing  after tax variable  profit at each  point in dme. Thus
ma*x P,y,  - W* v.
( y,V  (11  )
sub3ect  to equations  (1)  and (8), and given  the capital  stocks. Substituting  equation  (8) into  (11),
the first order conditions  are,D(Y"p~  ~  ~  ~~~e  l
- W, + lf,  ,  v  O  (12.2)
where t  a Y(oD/M/p  is the inverse  price elasticity  of product  demand, e  . (py/a)yyy is the
conjectural  elasticity,  X is the Lagrangian  multiplier  and the superscript  e denotes  equilibrium
values. 1 From equation (12.1), in short-run  equilibrium  a firm equates after tax marginal
revenue  to marginal  cost. The Lagrangian  multiplier  equals  marginal  cost. Equation  sc: (12.2)
implies that relative after tax variable factor prices equal relative marginal  products of the
respective  variable  factors. Equation  set (12)  holds  for all time periods and, of course, for all
firms  in the industry. Equation  set (12)  shows  how tax policy  affects  the short-run  equilibrium
The corporate  income  tax rate does  not directly  affect  the short-run  equilibrium.  From  equation
set (12)  relative  variable  factor  prices and the relative  product  price (all prices  are normalized
for example  by the nth variable  factor  price)  are independent  of the corporate  income  tax rate.
The reason  is that the corporate  income  tax is a tax on variable  profit in the short run, and as
a consequence,  it is based  on the residual  of the short run income  stream. Third, the corporat
income  tax rate, like the investment  tax credit and capital  cost allowance  rates indirectly  affect
the short-run  equilibrium  through  their  influence  on the demand  for the capital  inputs. Change
in these rates affect the after tax purchase  price of the capital inputs and thereby alter th
demand  for the quasi-fixed  factors. These  changes  in the capital  input  levels  then influence  th
short  run supply  of output  and demand  for the variable  factors  of production.
The short-run  equilibrium  conditions  are consistent  with a number  of product market
structures. The conjectual elasticity, e, shows the nature of firm interdependence  in the* 12  -
product market.  If e  - 0 then the product  market  is purely competitive  as firms are price
takers.  If o  - 1 then the product market  is purely monopolistic  as there is only a single
producer.  If e  *  y/y then the product  market  is oligopolistic  and the firms  are characterzed  as
Cournot-Nash  oligopolists.  In the latter case, if firms  have  the same  marginal  cost  in short-run
equilibrium  then from equation  (12.1), firms have the same conjectural  elasticity  in short-run
equilibrium.
An alternative  way that the short run equilibrium  conditions  can be characterized,
emphasizes  both product market imperfections  and the dual relationship  between  price and
quantity  effects  on variable  profit. Consider  a first order  approximation  to the revenue  of a firm
in equilibrium,
D( Y,, c,)y  - D(Y',  eg)yt D(Y,',et)  (I + 4  Vj,]  (y, -y,')  (13)
Collecting  terms yields,
pty  - pt,(l +  etE8)yt  - p,*y&','e''  (14)
From  equation  (14), total revenue  equals  revenue  earned  in a purely  competitive  product  market
plus the additional  revenue  eaned in equilibrium  because  of oligopoly  power. 2 Defining  the
purely  competitive  or shadow  product  price as p,' . pt'(l + g,)e,)  and the after tax shadow
product  price as P,'-  pt'(  - u.) then the short-run  equilibrium  conditions  (equation  set (12)  can
be obtained  by
max.  P:y,  - W.  v.(
(y  y,  v,)- 13 -
subject  to the production  function  and the given  levels  of the capital  inputs. Thus firms  act as
if they, maximize  after  tax shadow  variable  profit, which  is defined  as after  tax shadow  revenue
minus after tax variable input cost. 1 The reason is that the degree of  product market
imperfection  is captured  in the definition  of shadow  product  price.
The short-run  equilibrium  conditions  can be substituted  into (15) to obtain  the after tax
shadow  variable  profit function.
I  -(Pe,  W,,K,  K  AK,,A,)  (16)
where ?e is after tax shadow  variable  profit,  III is the after tax shadow  variable  profit function
which  is defined  for non-negative  after tax prices  and capital  inputs,  increasing  in the after tax
shadow  product  price and capital  inputs,  decreasing  in the after tax variable factor  prices and
net investment  in the capital  stocks. 2
The dual relationship  between  price and quantity  effects  in equilibrium  can be seen by
differentiatng  the after  tax shadow  variable  profit  function  by the after tax shadow  product  price
and the after tax variable  factor  prices. This yields,
y 5' -4  (17.1)
v  - -V l3n  (17.2)
The short-run  equilibrium  output  supply  and variable  factor  demands  cal be obtained  from the
after tax  shadow variable profit function.  It  implies that short-run equilibrium  can be
characterized  by equations  (16), (17.1)  and (17.2). The attractive  feature  of this  approach  is that
reduced  form output  supply  and variable  factor  demand  equations  are readily obtainable  from
the after tax shadow  variable  profit function.- 14  -
The second  stage of the program  involves  the deternination  of demand  for the capital
inputs. This stage relates to the intertemporal  aspects  of production  decisions.  Capital  input
demand  can be obtained  by considering  the expected  present  value  of the after tax shadow  flow
of funds.  The objective  is to
max.~
t...(8
subject  to the capital accumulation  equations  (denoted  by equation  set (2)).  The first order
conditions  for this problem  at any time  period, after substituting  equation  set (2) into (18), are,
V(ft'1aAK,)  - Q, +Ea (s,s+l)[v(8x:. 1I8Kg)  -[V(8iax 1/OAK  a)  (19)
+o1 -a) Q  ff1J -On
Equation  set (19) implies that the marginal  cost of a capital  input is equated  to the expected
marginal  benefit of that capital  input. 19 The marginal  cost consists  of two components;  the
after tax marginal  adjustment  cost and the after tax purchase  price.  The expected  marginal
benefit  consists  of three components;  the expected  after tax marginal  profit, the expected  after
tax adjustment  cost  saving  and after  tax purchase  price saving  from  installing  and purchasing  (or
renting) the respective  capital input in the previous period.  Equation set (19) shows the
intertemporal  trade-off  between  greater  expected  future  after tax profit due to increases  in the
capital  inputs  and smaller  current  after tax profit resulting  from increases  in the capital  inputs.
It is important  to notice that this equation  set contains  all current, as well as, expected  future
tax, credit and allowance  rates.  These  rates enter through  the after tax purchase  prices  of the
capital  inputs.15  -
The complete  set of equilibrium  conditions  are given by equations  (16), (17) and (19).
Equations  (16) and (17) define a short run equilibrium,  while equations  (16), (17) and (19)
define a temporary  equilibrium  of producer behavior. In the temporary  equilibrium  output
supply,  variable  factor  and capital  input  demands  are determined.
1.3  ESTIMATION  MODEL AND  TAX ELASTICMTIES
This section  parameterizes  the dynamic  model of production  presented  in section 1.2.
The  dynamic  nature  of the model  offers  many  advantages  in determining  the impact  of tax  policy
on output  supply  and input  demands. First, the model  treats  capital  inputs  different  from other
factors  of production  as producers  must  incur  adjustment  costs  to invest  in capital. Second,  the
model  allows for short-run,  intermediate-run  and long-run  effects  of tax policy initiatives  to
differ. These  effects  differ according  to the extent that capital  adjustment  has occurred.
In the empirical  specification  of the model,  it is assumed  that there is one output, two
variable  factors  (labor  and intermediate  inputs),  and one quasi-fiscal  factor. In order  to estimate
the dynamic  model of production  we need to parameterize  the after tax normalized  shadow
variable  profit function  (given  as equation  (16)  ).  This function  is assumed  to be normalized
quadratic  and is written  as
+  0-5  [P  A  +  PgWk'  +  Pa  8-1  +  POO'](0 ff Ps'  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(20)
+ pPWgS  + pop-  +  'As
+ P&W&, 1 + PkW&A + Pk3Kh $  + O.SIAsK 2- 16 -
where s,  is the after tax normalized  shadow  variable  profit (normalization  is by the after tax
price of intermediate  inputs), PI, is the 'fter  tax normalized  shadow price of output (see
equations  (13)-(1S)),  W,. is the normalized  labor input  price or normaliz  wage  rate, K, is the
capital  input, A, is the indicator  of technology  and &K,  represents  net investment.  All variables
are indexed  by the time  period s.
From the profit function, we find the equilibrium  conditions  for output supply and
variable factor demands  by differentiating  the after tax no-mnalized  shadow  variable profit
function  (e4uation  20) with  respect  to the relevant  prices. Thus we obtain  the following  specific
output supply  and input demand  functions  (which  we are given  as equations  (17.1) and (17.2)
in section  1.2),
Y - pp  +  PP3 + PpWI + PPkK8  +  P 1AI.  (21)
-vi  - PI +  PX  W +  P  + PA-,  + Pf3A,  (22)
Since -v  no  -P  ay  +W 1v1, then the intermediate input demand equation is
-v.  =Po  +Pa-I  + %A,  +  ,A,1 -05  3P,  -O
+  O.5p kK  +  0.5P,A,'  - ,P,PW 1. + PkIK,lA,  (23)
+ 0.Sp,AK2
Thus, equations  (21), (22)  and (23)  define  the short-run  equilibrium  conditions  based  on
the normalized  quadratic  after tax shadow  variable  profit function. These  equations  show  how
after tax output  and variable  input  prices  affect  output  supply  and variable  input  demands,  given
the levels  of the capital  stocks.- 17 -
The equilibrium  condition  for the capital  input, is given  by equation  (19) in section  1.2.
Based  on the normaized quadradc  after tax shadow  variable  profit function, the equilibrium
condition  for capital  can be written  as
pIAK9 - Q  (  +(I+p)-Y[,(pk  + PI&K5  +  P  +  1&W  I  (24)
+ PaA$.,  - ,,AK,.,  + Q,1(1 - 8))] - 0
where Q, is the normalized  after tax purchase  price of capital, 6 is the depreciation  rate and p
is the discount  rate.
If we assume  that after tax relative  prices, discount  rate and technology  indicator  are
expected  to remain  constant  then we obtain  the following,
-%Ar,1.. + (1+p)pYAK$ + p+Ka  +  k + p,  paWk+  pw,  - Q,(1  +p) + Q  ,(1-d)  mo  (25)
Re-arranging  we get
-p/a1. 1 +(pi  (2+p)P)K,, -(I+p)PuK..  * W-s-  (Pk + POP$ PRWb+  P2M)  (26
where  the normalized  after tax rental rate is Wk.-Q,(p+8).
Equation  (26)  defines  a second  order difference  equation  in terms of the
capital  stock. The solution  to this equation  is a flexible  accelerator,
Ks - K21- m (K, -K,-1)  (27)
whrce m a - OS(p + P  kk/P  -[(P +  /  Pkk  g )+4Pkk  pt lo-)  is the speed  of adjustment  of the
capital stock and the long-run capital stock is K,  - (%  p+,P,P'  + P&Wu  + P  -A  - Wb) -
Therefore,  by combining  equations  (7) and (8) we get,- 18  -
+4PAJPJO"(Pk+PW  (2+p  @--  8)
+(1  +0.5(p  +  PMPi,-[(p  + Puh
+4pidp;))X"1
Equation  (9) showe  the demand  for the capital  input. It is a function  of the relative  after
tax output  prices, variable  input  prices  and rental  rate, along with the discount  rate and lagged
quantity  of the capital  input. This equation  is nonlinear  in the parameters.
TMe  estimation  model  consists  of the system  of equations  made  up of equations  (21),  (22),
(23)  and (28). These  equations  describe  a temporary  equilibrium. There are four  endogenous
variables  output supply Y,, labor and material  input demands  v,, and v.  and capital input
demand,  K,.  In addition,  in the production  model  the exogenous  variables  are the normalized
after tax prices, P,W,h,WJ,, the discount  rate, p, lagged  capital,  Kg,,  the technology  indicator,
A, . The model  is linear  in the endogenous  variables  and nonlinear  in the parameters.
The model  estimates  are obtained  by  jointly  estimating  equations  (21), (22),  (23)  and (28)
using the maximum  Likelihood  estimator.  The estimated  profit function  must be convex  in
prices. Thus the parameters  must satisfy p.,> 0 p  > 0 and p. - P  >  0.  In addition,  the
profit function  must be concave  in capital  and net investment  so that, Bkk  <0 and Bi  < 0.
An important  feature of this model is that there are adjustment  costs associated  with
capital  accumulation.  These  costs  prevent  producers  from immediately  adopting  their  long-run
desired  levels  of capital,  and thereby  also  labor, materials  and output. Producers  adjust  towards- 19 -
the long run. The  speed  of adjustment  is given  by m in equation  (27). The dynamic  adjustment
process  has implicadons  for the effectiveness  of tax policy  changes. For example,  in the shnrt-
run output supply depends  on existing  capital, but not on the rental rate.  This means that
changes  in the capital  cost allowance  rate which  alter the rental rate of capital  do not have  an
effect on the supply  of output.  However,  as capital  adjustment  occurs  and the capital  input
changes  in response  to the new capital  cost allowance  rate then output  supply  is affected  by the
new rate.  Thus, in a dynamic context it is important  to distinguish  between the short,
intermediate  and long-run  effects  of tax policy.  In the short run, no capiti  adjustment  has
occurred,  in the intermediate  run capital  adjustment  has occurred  for one period, and in the long
run, the capital adjustment process has been completed.
Short-Run
The short-run  equilibrium  conditions  are based on equations  (21), (22), (23) and (28)
-The  short-run  equllibrium  condition  for output  supply  is
Y-'  +p,,P:+p$wi+p,&K,+1,A  (29.1)
The labor  and material  input  short-run  demand  functions  are
- p1 py  Pa+Puwb  +PsP:l+PziAa  (29.2
-'  . o  Ph%.  +,^  -*~  0.58  _,?  0.5g
*  O  e,  0.5.,NA. 2 - P,P.'WI  + P1*  ,.IA,  (29.3
+ 0.5p(I, 5 -
The equation  for the short-run  demand  for the capital  input  is- 20 -
-0.5  PA  it  r 1 A 
Pik11  Pi,+ lPM~  Pi,)
(t  +  PpkaPs  +  PaW  +  *PkA,  - Wx)  (29.4)
+  (1  - o-  p  +  Phk + E(P +  PAkp  +  4Pi*]  )bJ
where the superscript  s for the endogenous  variables  signifies  the short-run  equilibrium  of the
demand  functions.
The short-run  equilibrium  magnitudes  of output  supply  and input  demands  are determined
in the following  manner. The  short-run  demand  for capital  depends  on predetermined  variables.
These variables  are relative  after tax prices, indicator  of technology,  discount  rate and lagged
capital input.  Next, the output supply and variable input demands are simultaneously
determined.  These  variables  depend  on the after  tax relative  prices  of output  and labor (not  the
rental  rate), the technology  indicator  and lagged  capital  input.
Intermediate-Run
The equations  for the intermediate-run  are derived  from the short-run  equations. The
intermediate-run  is defined  with  respect  to the capital  adjustment  process  after one period. The
intermediate-run  equilibrium  condition  for output  supply  is
Y'.+  I  pp  +  *  P,P  + P  *j%  + P,,K,' + P  >A  (30.1)
The labor and material  input  demand  functions  for the intermediate-run  are described  as
-VI+  I  ,Pi + PWAU  + Ppf':  + pkKs  + Pi.Aa  (30.2)-21-
-Va.-  - PO  +  p+,-P 5 P,S2  - O.Sp.w"
+  0.50e,  +  0.SPWr2  - P/W  +  P  - A  (30.3)
+ O.SpU(K8.j - K8Y
The equation  for capital  input  intermediate-run  demand  is
*  (+.5IP)  (P  + pdp  [(p  +  §WpM2
+ 4PI3Pdi0J5)(Pk  + PA'  + PkW  +  P  - WA(30.4)
(30.4)
* (1 + O.S(p  +  - p + p&  fi)2
+ 4p,Jpj  0.5) K,'
Given  the technology  indicator  and relative  prices, these equations  show  the equilibrium
after one year.  The superscript  i indicates the intermediate-run. The intermediate-run
equilibrium  magnitudes  of output  supply  and input demands  are determined  in the following
manner. The intermediate-run  demand  for capital  depends  on predetermined  variables. These
variables  are relative  after  tax prices, indicator  of technology,  discount  rate and short-run  capital
input.  Next, the cutput supply  and variable input demands  are simultaneously  determined.
These  variables  depend  on the after tax relative  prices  of output  and labor (not the  rental rate),
the technology  indicator  and the short-run  demand  for capital.
Long-Run
In the long-run,  AK,  - 0.  Thus, investment  in the long-run  only  occurs  for replacemen
purposes. The long-run  output  supply  equation  is
yS  - +  *P  f  P^W  +  P;X  +  PwA,  (31.1- 22 -
The labor and material  input  uemand  equations  for the long-run  are
I  S  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
I~  - p1 +  pph? 6 plc  (31.2)
- Po + PkKXI  + PA  - O.SPPP  - OPiWs
+ 0.5sp;K  + 0.5s  P  + O.Sp",< - pb,bW,  (31.3)
+ P  jaK A,
Capital  input  demand  is given  by the following  equation
K,  - (-'/Pi,)[Pk  + pA,P;  + PI*  Wl + PhA, - W,J  (31.4)
In the long-run,  since the ca;.tal adjustn 'nt process  is completed,  output supplies  and
input  demands  are functions  of the iong-run  demand  for capital. The  demand  for  capital  depends
on exogenous  variables. Once  this denland  is obtained,  then output  supply,  labor and material
demands  can  be determined. Since  the long-run  demand  for capital  affects  output  supply,  labor
and material  demands  then the rental rate affects  these  variables.  Indeed,  in the long-run  all
inputs are variable  factors.
Rental Rate Elasticities  with Respect  to Tax Instrments
In order to determine  the effect  of tax policy  in stimulpting  investment,  it is necessary
to determine  the tax irnstrument  elasticities  of capital  demand  in each of the production  runs.
The tax instrumentl  elasticities  consist  of two components.  The first element  is the effect  of the
tax instrument  on the after tax relative  rental  rate of capital  (since  this is the only relative  price
directly  affected  by the tax policy). The second  component  is the elasticity  of the rental rate on
the demand  for capital  in each of the production  runs.- 23 .
We now consider the effects of the tax instruments  on the after tax relative rental rate.
The elasticity of the after tax rental rate with rspect  to the lTC rate is
-Q,(P  + 8)(1  u+  U(&z5 /8U))U&/,(1  -u)O  (32)
Increases in the lTC rate lower the relative price of the capital input.  In cases where investment
tax or incentive allowance (IIA) exist, the elasticity of rental rate of capital with respect to
allowance rate is:
ca,v  -Q(p  + d) (u  +  g(8'aI*a*))*a,/Iw*u(1  - u)  < o  (33)
Next, the effects of changes in the capital cost allowance (CCA) rate also operate through the
rental rate.  This elasticity is
ez,,w  - -Q(p  +  8)u.,(&z,/t3dd,fW,(l  - u)  < 0  (34)
I.creases in the CCA rate lower the relative price of the capital input.
The corporate income tax (Cm  rate affects the normalized or relative after tax rental
rate.  However, the CIT does not directly affect the other relative output and input prices.  The
CIT elasticity on the rental rate is
C*"  - Q(p  +  ,)(1  - V, - U 0Z)  u-IWb(1  - u.)>  0  (35)
Clearly, decreases in the CIT rate cause the relative price of the capital input to fall.
The effect of tax policy on capital demand in each of the short, intermediate  and long-run
is obtained by calculating the tax effect on the rental rate and then multiplying  this effect by the
rental rate elasticity of capital demand.-24-
1.4 TAX POLICY,  IMPACT ON INVESTMENT  AND  GOVERNMENT  REVENUES
In this section  we present  the results  of changes  in each tax instrument  on the demand
for capital  per cost to the government  of stimulatng  capital  demand. This ratio we refer to as
the benefit-cost  ratio.
Investmnent  Tax Credit and Allognc
For an investment  tax credit,  the change  in government  revenue  is
a  Qt(14 - (l-a)K:1)v,  (36)
The superscript  e denotes  the particular  equil£brium,  e = s,i,l for short, intermediate  and long-
run. For an allowance  with  a rate of *,  then  in the formula,  v, is replaced  by  ,u  . For a 1  %
change  in a rate multiply  the formula  by 0.01.
Cagital Cost Allowance
If depreciation  for tax purposes  is declining  balance, and tax credits do not affect
depreciation  for tax purposes,  then the change  in government  revenue  is
AGR; - -J(  (1-8)K-i)Ou  p  (37)
If depreciation  for tax purposes  is straightline,  and tax credits  do not affect it, then the
change  in government  revenue  is
AGR;  - Q((v)-(1-8)R  ))(  (38)- 25 -
Corrate  Income  Tax
The base for the income  tax rate is revenue  net of variable  cost, interest  payments  and
allowances  (all allowances,  for example  capital  cost and investment). Define  the base in year
s as
E  psy-  P  _8ys  - WtV  - - CCA, - IIA  (39)
where (with  one type of capital, see equation  (5)).
cCA* - E;.oQO- 5 s.-*d  (40)
where  I. "-  (KR'  - (--8) KR' 1).  Also
ITA.  *, Qs (KR - (1-8)K:)
Now the change  in government  revenue  in this case is
AGR,  - E:uc
Bnefit-Cost  Ratio
;  =  Ac  (41)
where the numerator is the nominal value of capital (before tax, not normalized)  in the
appropriate  equilibrium,  multiplied  by the elasticity  of  capital with respect to  the j  tax
inmtrument  (investment  tax credit, tax allowance,  capital  cost allowance,  income tax).  The
numerator  is the additional  capital  generated  by a specific  tax instrument. The denominator  is




The structure  of corporate  income  taxation  in Mexico  has undergone  major  changes  in
recent years.  During the 80's Mexican  cc-porate tax system allowed  indexation  of capital
consumption  allowances only.  Full indexation  of  the corporate income tAx base is now
permitted.  With indexation,  corporations  are no longer allowed  to deduct the inflationary
component of  interest expenditures  nor would they have to  accumulate  the inflationary
component  of interest income (see Gil-Diaz,  1990,  p. 79.)  Taxable  Profits (defined  as gross
receipts minus purchases  and business  expenses,  and net losses carried forward from other
periods)  are subject  to tax at a rate of 35% (a rate of 42% prevailed  in the pre-1987  period).
Depreciation  deductions  are indexed  or as an alternative,  the present value of depreciation
calculated  at a discount  rate of 7.5% may be deducted  fully in all regions except major
metropolitan  areas  and in all sectors  except  the automobiles.  In major metropolitan  areas only
60% of such  value  can be deducted  in the first year and the remaining  40% subjected  to capital
consumption  allowances.
It is instructive  to compare  the Mexican  taxation  of business  income  with a few of its
capital  exporting  partners  namely  United  States  and Canada. Table MI shows  that Mexico  has
moved  some distance  towards  a cash flow type of taxation  by allowing  a deduction  for the
present valu'. of the schecduled  depreciation  allowances  for the life of each type of assets
calculated  at a 7.5 percent annual  rate of interest  (see Gil-Diaz,  1990). Tax incentives  regime
in Mexico  has also undergone  significant  changes  over time. During  the past two decades,  tax
policy  was seen as a major  vehicle  for regional  and sectoral  development  while revenue- 27-
Table  NI
Nexico:  Toxation  of  DIsinmes Income, A Coapartive  Perspective
(percent)
TaX  regime  -H-::--  S--:::-v.!:-ffexi  (1991  tkIted  State  10)  i  - 19M  O9)
Corporate  income t  rate:  unerol1  35 *  3.9  *  38.9  34  +  6  40  28  +  15  43
Withhotding  tax  rates
Interest  3S  30  26
DivIdends  0-40  30  25
Technology trenefer  fees  21  30  25
Royalties  40  30  25
Indexation  of  deductfons  Fult  No  Mo
Loss carry  forward  5  15  7
Loss  carry  backiard  0  3  3
Niniumu/atternative  Ninima  tax  2  ass  ets  tox  20X  an  taxable  incom inclusive 0.175Y  an  capita(  in  exces of  $10
of  tax  preference  *Illion  creditable  againt  3X
tat  gairm  toxation  surtax  on  corporate  profits
Capital  galin  taxation
Coverage  Fult  FulL  Two-thirds
Indexation  Full  No  No
Rate  35  34  28
fDvidends deductien  go  Yes  Yes
Full  expensing  of  investumnt  No.  Present  Value  of  CCAs  No  Mo
lediately  daductible
Investment tax  credi  s  Energy irnestmnt.  Regiontl  wnd R&D
rehabilitation  of  real  estate,
targeted  job  credit
2/  In  Mexico  the  prof  i  t-sharing  rate  and,  in  the  United  States  nd  tan  d,  the  averae*  provincial  or  state  tax rates are added  to  the  basic  federal  rate.
Source:  Ugerte  (1966),  Price  Waterhouse  (1992),  Internationl  kureu  of  fiscal  Oocumentctien  (196),  and  Cil-Dlaz  (1990).-28  -
implications  of these  policies  were overlooked. A brief review  of historical  changes  in the tax
incentive  regime  in Mexico  is presented  below:
1955-1972: Between  20% (for secondary  industries)  and *0% (for basic industries)
corporate  income  of Mexican  majority  owned  enterprises  was  exempted  from  corporate  taxation
for periods varying  between  five to ten years.  The same industries  also could receive, upon
application,  exemption  from certain  indirect  taxes and import  duties  on capital  goods  imports.
1972-1979:  Industries that were seen to  promote decentralization  and regional
development  were granted  import duties  relief varying  from 50% to 100%  and reduction  in
corporate  tax liability  ranging from 10% to 40% depending  upon their location  and type of
activity.
1979-1986: The practice of import duty exemption  was continued. In addition,  tax
incentives  certificates  (CEPROFIS)  providing  tax credit  in the  range  of 10-25%,  depending  upon
location,  and type and size of the industry,  for investment  in physical  assets  were introduced.
These certificates  were negotiable  and could be used against  any federal  tax liability  by the
holder. These  certificates  proved  quite  popular  and in 1983  amounted  to 0.83 percent  of GDP
in revenue  losses.  While the manufacturing  sector was a major beneficiary  of this scheme,
mining,  agriculture  and transportation  industres also  received  significant  amount  of resources.
Among  the manufacturing  industries,  paper and publishing,  chemicals  and food and beverages
received  a majority  of the assistance.
While  CEPROFIS  were  the most  important  fiscal  incentive,  Mexican  government  offered
also  offered  special  incentives  were export  promotion  (CEDIS),  development  of duty-free  zones
special  tax preferences  to automobile,  cement,  publishing  and mining  industries.- 29 -
1987-1900: The tax incentives  certificates  scheme was significantly  tightened  and
targeted  to priority  industries  and preferred  zone. Top tax  credit rate for CEPROFI  was raised
to 40% of total  physical  investment  in 1986. In addition  Mexican-owned  enterprises  are eIigibl
for employment  tax credit  up to 30% of three times  the annual  area minimum  wage  multipli:
by the number  of new  jobs created.
Starting  in 1989,  full expensing  of the present  value  of capital  consumption  allowances
calculated  using  a 7.5% discount  rate was offered  as an alternative  option  to standard  capit
consumption  allowances  in non-metropolitan  areas. In the metropolitan  industrialized  areas  of
Mexico  City, D.F., Monterrey  and Guadalajara,  only 60% of the present  value  of depreciatio
allowances  could be deducted  in the first year.  R&D investment  tax credit at 15% for the
purchase  of technological  research  (20%  for small  and micro  enterprises),  and 20% for capital
purchases by technological  enterprises (30% for small and micro enterprises)  were also
permissible.
199  1-Prtsent:  Effective 1991 all  CEPROFI related incentives were  eliminated.
However,  the immediate  deduction  of present  value of investment  expenditures  discounted  at
7.5% per annum  still remains.*  30 -
1.5.2  Tax Policy Effects on the Rental Rate and Capital
The model  was applied  to two Mexican  industries;  detergents  and other  chemicals. The
data  for these  two three-digit  Mexican  industries  for the period  1970  to 1983  was  collected  from
a variety  of Government  of Mexico  sources. These  two industries  are among  the three largest
industries  in the industrial  sector (SIC 35) comprising  of chemicals,  petroleum  derivatives,
rubber and plastics  products. Together  these  two industries  accounted  for 5.2 percent of total
manufacturing  output  and 2.9 percent  of total employment.  The data on industry  capital  stock
was developed  by using  the perpetual  inventory  method  with an assumed  depreciation  rate of
0.08, representing  a weighted  average  of assumed  depreciation  rates of 0.1 for machinery  and
equipment  and 0.025 for structures  respectively.)  Quantity  of labor was measured  as the
average  number  of employees  during  the year. The price of labor was derived  by dividing  the
total employment  cost during the year by average number of  employees.  Quantity of
intermediate  input, was obtained  by dividing  the cost of intermediate  inputs  by the input price
index.
We wil now examine  the effects  of corporate  tax policy  initiatives  in stimulating  capital
expenditures  in the short, intermediate  and long runs for the case of Mexico. The three tax
instruments  that we consider  for Mexico  are the corporate  income  tax (CM rate, the investment
tax credit (ITC) rate, and the capital  cost allowance  (CCA)  rate.  As discussed  earlier on the
theoretical  and empirical  models,  only the relative  price of the capital  input is directly  affected
by tax policy initiatives  (see  equations  (32)-(35)). Thus, the relative  after tax rental rate is a
crucial variable in  the determination  of  the effects of  tax policy initiatives on  capital
expenditures. In table M2 we present  the elasticities  of the tax instruments  on the rent  rate.- 31 -
Since the normalized after tax rental rate on capital is the same for both industries, the results
found for the elasticities of rental rate of capital with respect to the three instruments are also
the same.  These elasticities remain relatively constant over the sample period.  As seen in table
M2, a 1 percent increase in the CCA rate results in a 0.63 percent decrease in the normalized
after tax rental rate, whereas a 1 percent rise in the ITC rate leads to a 0.41 percent decline in
the relative rental rate.  In fact, a 1 percent increase in the CIT rate leads to around a  1.00
percent increase in the after tax relative rental rate.  The results for the short, intermediate and
long-run tax elasticities for capital demand appear in Table M3.
Table M2
Elasticities of Rental Rate of Capital with Respect to Tax Measures
Year  e
1979  -0.405  -0.621  0.895
1980  -0.409  -0.635  0.918
1981  -0.409  -0.635  0.962
1982  -0.409  -0.635  1.021
1983  -0.409  -0.635  1.021- 32 -
Table M3
Capital Demand Elasticities
Detergents  Other Chemicals
1979  1983  1979  1983
Short-Runl
ekft  0.015  0.012  0.008  0.006
e  - ,  0.024  0.019  0.013  0.009
e,,  -0.034  -0.031  -0.018  -0.014
Intermediate-Run
es,  0.020  0.016  0.011  0.007
e-,  0.031  0.024  0.016  0.012
eit  4-0.045  -0.039  -0.023  -0.019
Long-Run
e,k,,  0.022  0.017  0.012  0.008
ekse.  0.034  0.027  0.018  0.013
eu,,  -0.049  -0.043  -0.026  -0.021- 33 -
1.5.3  Tax Incentives,  Investment  Impacts  and Foregone  Revenues
Although  focusing  on investment  expenditure  only  provides  a partial view of the effects
of tax policy,  in this section,  we  calculate  investment  input  per unit  value  of foreign  government
revenue. This measure  is referred to as the incremental  benefit-cost  ratio in Table M4. These
calculations  are presented  for the most  recent year (1983)  in the data as well as wi  earlier year
(1979), together with the mean and standard  deviation  for the 1979-83  period.  The table
suggests that the effectiveness  of  investment  tax credit for both Mexican industries has
deteriorated  in recent  years  and the measure  is not cost-effective  in any of the runs. Accelerated
capital consumption  allowances, have also proved to be  not cost-effective  tax incentive
instruments  as the benefit-cost  ratio for this measure  is less than one in all runs for the two
industries.  Finally, while corporate tax rate reductions  have had fairly large impacts on
stimulating  capital expenditures  in the detergents  and other chemicals  industries, revenues
foregone  from  such  reductions  far exceed  the positive  investment  impacts  thereby  yielding  a low
benefit-cost  ratio.  Thus it is apparent  that ali three tax incentives  proved  to be cost-ineffective
in all runs for the two industries  examined  here.- 34 -
Table M4
Investment Impacts Per Unit Value of Lost Tax Revenue
Impact
Short Run  Intermediate  Long
Tax Instrument  Industry  Year  Run  Run
Investment  Tax Credit  Detergents  1979  0.55  0.69  0.74
Other Chemicals  0.28  0.36  0.40
Detergents  1983  0.44  0.51  0.54
Other Chemicals  0.26  0.32  0.34
Detergents  Mean  0.57  0.71  0.77
(s.d.)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.16)
Other Chemicals  0.26  0.35  0.40
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)
Accelerated Capitol  Detergents  1979  0.40  0.50  0.54
Consumption Allowance  Other  'hemicals  0.20  0.27  0.29
Detergents  1983  0.32  0.38  0.40
Other Chemicals  0.19  0.24  0.25
Detergents  Mean  0.42  0.52  0.57
(s.d.)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.12)
Other Chemicals  0.19  0.26  0.29
(0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)
Corporate Income Tax  Detergents  1979  0.05  0.06  0.07
Rate Reductions  Other Chemicals  0.01  0.02  0.02
Detergents  1983  0.03  0.04  0.05
Other Chemicals  0.01  0.01  0.01
Detergents  Mean  0.04  U.06  0.06
(s.d.)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Other Chemicals  0.01  0.01  0.02
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)-35  -
1.6  PAISTAN
1.6.1 Tax HListory
Pakistan  has followed  a stable  corporate  tax rate regime since the early 1960s. The
corporate  income  tax at 30% and a super tax at 20-25% have been maintzined  consistently
during  the last two decades. Only in the fiscal  year 1989-90  the super tax rte  was brought
down to 15%.  Foreign direct investment  receives tax treatment equivalent  to  domestic
investment.  Losses  are allowed  to be carried  forward  six years, but no carryback  of such  losses
is permitted. A sales tax at 12.5%  is payable  on all domestically  manufactured  goods  Dy  the
producer  and on imported  goods  by the importer. In the fiscal  year 1989-90,  import  duties  at
differential  rates  were imposed  on imported  machinery  and equipment.  These  rates  varied  from
20% to 50% if similar  machinery  was not manufactured  in Pakistan,  and a higher  rate of 80%
applied  to imported  machinery  with domestic  substitutes.
The regime of fiscal incentives  through the corporate income tax has experienced
significant  changes over time, as Palistan has relied upon a variety of fiscal incentives  to
stimulate  investment. Thcse include  accelerated  capital  consumption  allowances  for certain
physical  assets, full  expensing  for R&D  investments,  tax rebates,  regional  and industry  specific
tax holidays,  and investment  tax credits. These  are briefly  discussed  below. Further  details  of
the current  tax regime  are given  in Table  P1.
Tax holidays:  Tax holidays  for two years  for specific  industries  (e.g. engineering  goods)
and specific  regions  (most  of the country  except  major  metropolitan  areas)  were introduced  in
1959-60. The holiday  period was subsequently  raised to four years in 1960-61. These tax
holidays  were eliminated  in 1972-73  but reinstated  again  in 1974-75. Presently  tax holidays  for-36  -
five years are permitted  to engineering  goods, poultry  farming  and processing,  dairy farming,
cattle or sheep breeding,  fish farming,  data processing,  industries  manufacturing  agricultural
machinery,  and also to all industries  in designated  areas of the country.
Investment  tax credits:  Industries  are eligible for varying tax credits according to
location.  A general tax credit for balancing,  modernization,  and replacement  of plant and
equipment  was introduced  at a rate of 15  %, but its application  was restricted  to designated  areas.
Since 1976-77,  the credit  was made  available  regardless  of location  and  ype  of industry. This
credit was withdrawn  in 1989-90  but reintroduced  in 1990-91.
Accelerated  capital  consumption  allowances: Capital  consumption  allowances  follow
accelerated  schedules  for machinery  and equipment,  transport  vehicles  and housing  for workers
(25%),  oil exploration  equipment  (100%),  ship building  (20-30%),  and structures  (10%)  on a
declining  balance  method.  Expenditures  relating to research and development,  transfer and
adaptation  of technologies  and royalties  are eligible  for full expensing.
1.6.2 Tax Policy  Effects on the Rental  Rate and Capital
The r.odel was applied to the wearing apparel (SIC Code: 322) and the leather and
leather  products  industries  (SIC  Code:  323)  industries  of Paldstan  for the period 1966  to 1984.
The data  on these  two manufacturing  industries  was  collected  primarily  from the various  issues
of  the two annual publications  of  the  Government  of  Pakdstai.  namely the  Census of
Manufacturing  Industries  and the Economic  Survey.  The wearing  apparel industry  in 1984
contributed  0.63 percent  of the total manufacturing  output and employed  roughly  one percent
of the total manufacturing  labor force. The leather and leather  products  industry,  on the other- 37  -
Table Pl
The Structure of Corporate Income  Tax System in Pakistan 1990-91.
A.  CIT ras  applied to all income  cxcept dividends  and bonus shares:
1.  Income  tax rate  30
2.  Super tax rue:
-Bakng  oompmi  25
-Non-banking  corpanies  (NB)  20
3.  Suchargae  10
D.  CIT  aze  applied to intcrcorporatc  dividends  (ID) & bonus shares (BS):
1.  Income tax on D  nd  BS  0
2.  Super tax on dividends  rcived  by
-Domestic  publio  companies  5
-Poreign compania  IS
-Domeado  private companies  20
3.  Super tax on bonus shares  issued by
-publio companiea  10
-privaes  companies  is
C.  Tax rebae:
1.  Tax rebates  on super tax for NB public oompaniae  (NBPUC)  10
2.  Tax rebates  on super tax for small companics  5
3.  Tax rebata on super tax for companies  angaged  in spocifc economic  activities 2 10-15
4.  Tax rbata  on income & super taxes for exportu  25-75
D.  Tax Credius  on the amount of investment  in:
1.  Sharel/debentures  of the Equity  Participation  Fund  50
2.  Dcbenturesnegniable bonds  S
3.  Shars  of industrial  companie set up in Lackward  areas  10-30
4.  Plant/machinery  for bal., mod., repl. or extension  (BMR.E)  15
E.  Depreciaton AllowaLncea
1.  'Normal  (annual) depreciation  allowsnca  (ND)  5-30
2.  Extra shiA  working LUcwances  (u  % of ND) on plant  50-100
3.  Initial  deprociation  allowances  25-100
P.  Pull tax holiday, raging  from 4-10 yesrs, for comparies engagod  in:
-manufacturing  garments
-key industrice
-anufacturing  electrical equipment/its  components  & set up in NWP
-fih'  catching, cattle/sheep  breeding & dairy faJrming
-wcxpiora;5on  of specific minertl
-an indt4riLl undertaking  aet up in an export  processing  zone
-producing  defense  equipment or arnuemnt. set up in specific  Lreas
-industia  undertaings  set up in specific backward  regions
Purta  tax  holidays (25-50% of  the  capital), ranging for 5-10  year,  for  oompanies  set up  in  specific
regions and engaged in manufaucturing  goods, ship buildinp  and navigadon, or generaion  and supply of
electrical  energy or hydraulic  power.
Surwhage are levied on total income and super taxes if the company's taxable income, including  dividends,
exceds  Rs. 100,000.
'  In the cae  of NBPUCs,  this is an additional  tLx rebate on super tax.
Source:  Ehdai, J.  1991).- 38 -
hand, in 1984, accounted  for 1.8% of total value of output and employed  one percent of
manufacturing  labor force.  Together, these two industries accounted  for 2.4 percent of
manufacturing  output  in 1984.
The quantity  of labor is measured  as total number  of days worked  during  the year and
a labor price index was developed  by dividing  total employment  cost during  the year by the
number  of days worked.  The value of materials  or intermediate  inputs include electricity,
petroleum  fuel, natural  gas, and imported  and domestically  produced  miscellaneous  materials.
The quantity  of materials  was  constructed  by dividing  the total  value  of materials  by an industry
level materials  price deflator.  The quantity  of output  was  constructed  by dividing  the total value
of output by an industry output deflator.  The series on capital stock were developed  by
employing  perpetual  inventory  method  to investment  series  and assuming  a depreciation  rate of
0.08.  This represents  a weighted  average  of assumed  depreciation  rates of 0.1 for machinery
and equipment  and 0.025 for structures  respectiveiy.
We now consider  the effects  of the three tax instruments;  the investment  tax credit (ITC)
rate, capital  cost allowance  (CCA)  rate and corporate  income  tax (CIT) rate on the rental  rate
of capital. Table P2 shows  the emprical results  we obtained  for the elasticities  of rental rate
of capital with respect to various tax measures  for Palistan's wearing  apparel and leather
products  industries. The magnitude  of the ITC  elasticity  increased  from 1977  to 1984. In 1984,
a 1 percent rise in the ITC rate leads to a fall of 0.39 percent  in the normaized after tax factor
price of the capital  input. Over the same  period  time, the CCA elasticity  of the relative  rental
rate of capital decreased. The CIT elasticities  differ slightly  across the leather  products  and
wearing apparel industries,  but over time the elasticities  differ dramatically. In the leather- 39 -
products  industry  a 1 percent  change  in the CIT rate leads to a 0.42 percent  rise in 1977  in the
normalized  after tax rental  rate of capital. However,  in 1984, increases  in the CIT rate result
in a rise of only 0.04  percent  in the relative  rental  rate. In 1977,  a 1 percent  increase  in the CIT
rate results in a 0.36 percent increase  in the relative rental rate in the apparel industry. By
1984,  a rise  in the CIT rate leads to a rise in the price of capital  input of about 0.03 percent  in
the same industry. The ITC elasticities  are larger in absolute  value than the CCA and CIT
elasticities  in 1984  although  in 1977  the CIT elasticities  are larger than comparable  elasticities
for the ITC and CCA rates. The results  for the short, intermediate  and long-run  tax elasticities
for capital  demand  appear  in Table P3.
Table P2
Elasticity  of Rental  Rate of Capital  With Respect  to Tax Measures
Apparel
1977  -0.338  -0.285  0.359
1984  -0.386  -0.225  0.034
Leather
1977  -0.326  -0.287  0.425
1984  -0.386  -0.225  0.037- 40 -
Table  P3
Capital  Demand  Elasticities
ApparelLehr
.Shor-Rn
e,,,,  0.011  0 004  0.003  0.002
ek,,  0.009  0.002  0.003  0.001
Xt*  -0.012  -0.004  -0.004  -0.0002
tadtRun
e*,,,  0.019  0.008  0.006  0.003
e.  - ,0.016  0.005  0.006  0.002
e,k  -0.021  -0.007  -0.008  -0.0003
LonzRun
et.,,  0.046  0.029  0.016  0.006
et.  0.038  0.017  0.014  0.004
euk  -0.048  -0.003  -0.021  -0.0006
1.6.3 Tax Incentives, Investment Impacts and Foregone  Revenues
the  benefit  cost ratios for each  of Eme  tax incentive  for Pakistan  are presented  in Table
P4 for the most  recent year (1984)  in the data  as well  as for an earlier  year (1977),  together  with
the mean  and standard  deviation  for the 1977-84  period. In carrving  out these  calculatiors,  we
note that investment  is most responsive  to changes in investment  tax credit. The loss Li
government  revenues  are quite similar  for ITC and CCAs,  and therefore,  ITC yields  a slightly
higher  benefit-cost  ratio  than CCA  changes.  For corporate  tax rate reductions  loss  in government
revenues  far exceed  th^ investment  impacts.  Investment  impacts  for all measures  werc smaller
in recent  years compared  to earlier  years  for the short and immediate  runs due to the observed
decline in own price elasticity  of capital in recent years. Thus the table suggests  that the
investment  tax credit became  a cost-effective  measure  for boLh  indlustries  in recent years  based
on its long run impact only.  A similar pattern  of cost-efftct!ivenc.ss  emerges  for accelerated- 41 -
capital  consumption  allowances. Such allowances  were not cost-effective  in the short and
intermediate  run, and became cost effective  in recent years based on the long run impact.
Finally,  corporate  tax rate reductions  had very large  positive  impacts  on stimulating  investment
on both the apparel  or leather  products  industries  but these  impacts  were outweighed  by major
revenue  losses  to the national  treasury. Thus for Pakistani  industries,  the three tax incentives
considered  were ineffective  in stimulating  investment  in recent years but in view of a better
record  of accelerated  depreciation  allowances  and investment  tax credits  in earlier  years, perhaps
a  redesign of  such incentives  with some consideration  for  refundability  provisions and
elimination  of regulatory  bottlenecks  wou!d help restore their effectiveness  in stimulating
investments.- 42 -
Table P4
Investment Impacts Per Unit Value of Lost Tax Revenue
IstmentTax Credit  Apparel  Mea7  0.40  0.76  1.11
Leather  0.26  0.25  0.24
Apparel  198.4  0.28  0.71  2.50
Leather  0.11  0.28  2.54
Appure  Mean  0.40  0.76  0.70
(s.d.)  (0.18)  (0.34)  (2.13)
Leather  0.24  0.36  0.37
(0.22)  (0.32)  (1.44)
Accelerated Capital  Apparel  1977  0.52  0.64  0.81
Consumption Allowances  Leather  0.18  0.18  0.17
Apparel  1984  0.23  0.59  2.10
Leather  0.09  0.23  2.13
Apparel  Mean  0.31  0.60  0.51
(s.d.)  (0.13)  (0.27)  (1.70)l
Leather  0.19  0.28  0.25
(0.18)  (0.26)  (1. 14)
Corporate Income Tax  Apparel  1977  0.05  0.13  L.21
Rate Reductions  Leather  0.01  0.01  0.02
Apparel  1984  0.00  0.00  0.00
Leather  0.00  0.00  0.00
Apparel  Mman  0.00  0.)4  0.08
(s.d.)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)
Leather  0.00  0.00  0.01
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)-43  -
1.7 TURKEY
1.7.1 Tax  History
The  corporate  income  tax in Turkey  provides  a significant  source  of government  revenues
(accounting  for 10%  of total tax revenues)  as well as serve as major  tool of industrial  policy.
The government  has changed  both  the tax rate and the tax base  many  times  during  the past three
decades. The statutory  corporate  tax rate hovered  around 10%  during the SO's, rose to 20%
in the 60's and to 25%  in the 70's.  In 1980,  it was raised  to 50%,  lowered  to 40% in 1981  and
then raised  again  to 46% (plus  a defense  surcharge  of 3  %) in 1985  and has stayed  at that level
since  then.  Over  these  years  there also  have  been  significant  tax base changes  (see  Bulutoglu  and
Thirsk, 1990).  Preferential  treatment  of public  enteprises has been  eliminated  since 1980. Inter-
company dividends distribution have been  made exempt from  taxation and  corporate
reorganizations  are no longer  subject  to capital  gains  taxation. Inflationary  adjustment  of assets
but not of liabilities  have  been also allowed.
In the following,  we briefly  summarize  the current  provisions  of the corporate  taxation
and investment  incentives  regimes  which appear  in Table T1.  Taxable income of corporate
entities (defined  as book profits before taxes plus increases  in pension reserves and general
provision  for bad debt  minus  investment  and export  allowances  and depreciation  deductions  etc.)
is currently  taxed  at a flat rate of 46%. A 3% defence  surcharge  is payable  on this basic rate.
In addition,  a 1  % tax is payable  to the Social  Assistance  and Security  Fund, and an additional
1% tax is levied  for the Apprenticeship,  Vocational  and Training  Encouragement  Fund, for a
combined  corporate  tax rate of 49.38%.  Corporate  tax is withheld  at source  at varying rates
with 0% rates for dividend  distributions,  5% for income  from crude oil exploration,  10%  on-44 -
interest  and moveable  property  income,  20% for income  from immoveable  property,  and 25%
for salaries  and wages  and patents  and royalties.
Depreciation  allowances  are based on historical  costs adjusted  by the wholesale  price
index  minus 10% and take  the form of ten-year  interest  bearing  bonds. Either  the straight-line
or declining  balance method  of depreciation  may be chosen for any asset, but no switch  is
allowed  from the straight-line  to the declining  balance  method during the life of the asset.
Depreciation  on moveable  fixed  assets  acquired  on or after January  1, 1983  may  be taken  under
a straight-line  method  at any rate chosen  by the tax payer, up to an annual  maximum  of 25  %.
If the declining  balance method  is used, the maximum  allowable  depreciation  rate is 50%.
Assets  having  values  less than 5,000 TL can be deducted. For structures  and moveable  fixed
assets  acquired  before  January  1, 1983,  the Ministry  of Finance  publishes  maximum  depreciation
rates (on a straight-line  basis)  permissible  for tax purposes. These  rates typically  are 4% for
factory buildings, 15% - 20% for transport  equipment, and 12.5  % for machinery  and equipment.
A value-added  tax is levied  at a general  rate of 12  %. Banking  and insurance  transactions
are subject  to a 3 % tax (BrMT).  There is an investment  incentive  allowance  in Turkey  which
is a deduction  from the taxable  income for corporate  tax purposes. The deduction  is claimed
in the year of  investment  on that portion of investment  which is not subsidized  by the
government. Unused  investment  allowances  can be carried forward  indefinitely. The rate of
investment  allowance  varies  by region  and type of investment.
Corporations  can  also set  aside  up to 25  % of taxable  income  for future  investments.  The
amount  set aside at the discretion  of the corporation  is deducted  from its taxable  income and
deposited  in an interest  bearing  account  (earning  the same  interest  as government  bonds,  usually- 45 -
about 20% p.a.) with the Central  Bank. It can be withdrawn  any time with authorization  from
the State Planning  Office  and used for investment.
For tax purposes, capital is depreciated  at a rate of up to 50% for machinery  and
equipment. Further assets  can be revalued  at the end of every calendar  year.
A large  number  of non-tax  incentives  are available  to eligible  investments.  These  include
low interest  credit,  funds  for working  capital,  allocation  of foreign  exchange,  and allowance  for
import  of used equipment.-46  -
Table Ti
The Structure of Corporate Income Tax System in Turkey 1990/91
(Figures in percent)
Corporate Income Tax:  General  46
Withholding tax rates  on payments by a domestic
corporation to a foreign corporation
Rental from fixed assets  20
Leasing  0.5
Royalties on patents  25
Professional services  15
Petroleum services  S
Interest on trade receivables  10
Other interest (loans and deposits)  10
Withholding taxes on payments to nonresident individuals
Rentals from immovable assets  20
Royalties on patents  25
Services (professional)  15
interest on receivables & deposits  10
Value-added tax
Standard rate  12
Agricultural product  1
Basic foods, books, natural gas  6
Luxury goods  20
Petroleum products  13
Banlkng and Insurance transactions tax  5
Investment incentive allowance  30-100 of the cost of
specified assets
Export allowance
Export earnings of manufacturer  12
Export earnings of traders  3
Export of fresh truit, vegetables  12
International Transport  12




Source:  Price Waterhouse (1992)- 47 -
1.7.2 Tax Pollcy  Effects on the Renl  Rate and Capital
The model Is applied  to three Turldsh  industries;  non-electrical  machinery  (SIC 382),
electrical  machinery  (SIC  383)  and transport  equipment  (SIC  384)  industries  in the private  sector
only and covers the period 1973 to  1985.  These industries accounted  for 20% of  total
manufacturing  output  and employment  and 24% of manufacturing  wages  in 1985.  The data  on
output, employment,  intermediate  input and investment  were obtained from a  variety of
Government  of Turkey  sources. The quantity  of labor was measured  as the average  number  of
employees  during  the year. The price index was constructed  by dividing  total employment  cost
during  the year by average  number  of employees.  Intermediate  inputs  or materials  include  raw
materials, components, containers, fuel and electricity.  The quantity of  materials was
constructed  by dividing  total value  of materials  by an industry  materials  deflator. The quantity
of output  was constructed  by dividing  the total value  of output  by the relevant  industry  output
price deflator. The same deflator  was used both for the electrical  machinery  and transport
equipment  industries. The capital  stock  series were  developed  by applying  perpetual  inventory
method  to investment  series and by assuming  depreciation  rate equal to 0.08, representing  a
weighted  average  of assumed  depreciation  rates of 0.1 for machinery  and equipmen and 0.025
for structures.1
The effects  of the three tax instruments  on the rental rate of capital  are given in Table
T2.  Since  the normalized  after tax rental  rate on capital  is the same  for the three industries,  the
results  found  for the tax elasticities  are also the same. From table  T2, we observe  that the IA
elasticity  increases  over the sample  period, whereas the CCA and CIT elasticities  remain
relatively  constant. Over the first  half of the sample  period, a 1 percent  increase  in the IIA  rate- 48 -
decreases the afkr  tax rental rate by 0.20 percent.  Over the second half of the period, the
elasticity ranges from -0.24 to -0.35.  For most of the period the elasticity associated with the
CIT rate ranges from 0.21 to 0.28 and then decreases of the last few  years.  Generally, the
CCA rate clasticity ranges from 0.70 to 0.10 for most of the period.  The results for the short,
intermediate and long-nm tax elasticities for capital demand appear in Table T3.
Table T2
Elastcities of Rental Rate of Capital With Respect To Tax Measures
._  _  _  _ 
1973  -0.199  -0.065  0.210
1974  -0.195  -0.086  0.242
1975  -0.196  -0.084  0.238
1976  -0.199  -0.067  0.212
1977  -0.197  -0.078  0.229
1978  -0.193  -0.098  0.260
1979  -0.193  -0.096  0.259
1980  -0.242  -0.129  0.386
1981  -0.348  -0.147  0.259
1982  -0.345  -0.155  C.276
1983  -0.258  -0.064  0.057
1984  -0.258  -0.063  0.055
1985  -0.341  -0.099  0.101- 49 -
Table T3
Capital  Demand Elasticities
1974  1985  1974  i  19  1974  f1988
..... ~~~i  74  ...............  .........  .
ShorRn
ewk,,  0.014  0.013  0.024  0.021  0.024  0.020
e-,,  0.006  0.004  0.010  0.006  0.010  0.006
eb,,  -0.017  -0.004  -0.029  -0.006  -0.029  -0.006
Intomediate
&a
ek.  ak^;0.021  0.021  0.037  0.033  0.037  0.032
J  e-.  0.009  0.006  0.016  0.009  0.016  0.009
3  et.,,  -0.027  -0.006  -0.046  -0.009  -0.046  -0.009
Long-Run
eti,  0.034  0.034  0.059  0.052  0.055  0.051
e-,  0.015  0.009  0.026  0.015  0.026  0.015
Ckck  0.042  -0.009  -0.074  -0.015  -0.074  -0.015
1.7.3 Tax Incentives, Investment Impacts and Foregone Revenues
Table T4 presents the benefit-cost ratios for the three Turkish industries for two years
1975 and 1985 and the mean and standard derivation for the sample period 1975-1985. A 1%
Lhicase in investment allowance (IIA) had the largest effect on capital while a similar change
in capital consumption allowances (CCAs) and corporate tax rate reductions had relatively
smaller impacts. This is because the elasticity  of rental rate of capital with respect to investment
allowances is much higher than with respect to capital consumption allowances and corporate
tax rate reductions.  The loss in tax revenue associated with tax rate reduction are quite large- 50 -
and therby yielding  a low benefit-cost  ratio for such  a policy  change. The revenue  losses  are
larger  for the  investment  allowance  than  for changes  in capital  consumption  allowances  and since
investment  impacts  are higher  for the former  measure,  the net effect  is to yield similar  benefit-
cost ratios for the two measures. The benefit-cost  ratio is smaller for almost  all measures  in
1985  relative  to 1975. This results  from a decline  in the elasticity  of capital  stock  to a change
in its own rental rate.  Note that the capital  stock  increases  over time, implying  that if the own
price elasticity  of capital were to be constant,  investment  response  to changes  in rental rate
would have to increase  at the same rate as the increases  in capital  stock.  It is unlikely  that
investment  response  will increase  at the same  rate because  it would  imply  an unrealistic  increase
in the marginal  product  of capital. Thus it is reasonable  to expect  own price  elasticity  of capital
to  decline over time.  In  conclusion, the table suggests that investment  allowances  and
accelerated  depreciation  provisions  proved to be effective  instruments  of public policy for
investment  promotion,  especially  based on their intermediate  and long run impacts. The same
could  not however,  be said  about  corporate  tax rate reductions  which  clearly  resulted  in windfall
gains  to existing  capital  without  encouraging  new  investment.Table T4
Invoitmen hmpctds  Per Unk Value of Lost Tax Revenue
: ;.  ;  :  jj  i i  j  j  ji;*  R . ..; 
nvestinet  Allowance  Electrical Machinery  1975  0.63  0.97  1.50
Non-Elect-cl  Mchinery  1.00  1.59  2.62
Trnapon  Equipment  1.14  1.71  2.56
Electial  Machinery  19U.  0.40  0.72  1.54
Non-Eloctrical  Machinery  0.86  1.42  2.49
Tranport Equipmet  1.00  1.54  2.40
Electrical Machinery  Mean  0.53  0.84  1.37
(s.d.)  (0.012)  (0.17)  (0.29)
Non-Electrica Machinery  0.81  1.29  2.12
(0.17)  (0.28)  (0.51)
Transport Equipment  0.85  1.34  2.19
(0.23)  (0.35)  (0.60)
c apiwal  ElBouia  Machinery  1975  0.56  0.86  1.33
naumption  AllowUanc  Non-Electio Machinery  0.89  1.42  2.34
Transport Equipmet  1.01  1.53  2.28
Elebia  Machinery  1985  0.38  0.6"  1.45
Non-Electic Machinery  0.51  1.33  2.34
TanAport Equipment  0.94  1.44  2.25
Electrical Machinery  Mean  0.47  0.75  1.22
(s.d.)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.24)
Non-Electical Machinery  0.72  1.15  1.39
(0.14)  (0.23)  (0.43)
Trasponation  Equipment  0.76  1.20  1.94
(0.20)  (0.31)  (0.5  1)
orporale Income  Tax  erical  Machincry  1975  0.32  0.56  0.84
Reduction  Non-Blootl  Machinay  0.16  0.27  0.45
Tranport  Equipment  0.20  0.31  0.50
Eletoaricl  Machinery  1985  0.20  0.21  0.28
Non-Electrical  Machinery  0.07  0.11  0.19
Traupot  Equipment  0.03  0.06  0.10
Electrical  Machinery  Mean  0.06  0.01  0.00
(s.d.)  (0.36)  (0 28)  (0.45)
Non-Electrical  Machinery  0.05  0.03  0.07
(0.37)  (0.51)  (0.38)
Transport Equipmenz  0.08  0.02  0.12
(0.71)  (0.23)  (0.96)52 -
1.8  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides  an empirical  framework  for the assessment  of tax policy  effects  on
the array of producer decisions  concerning  output supplies  and input demands  in Mexico,
Paldstan  and Turkey. A dynamic  production  structure  model  is specified  and estimated  for this
purpose  for selected  industries  in each  of the count'. s.
On the Elasticity  of Rental  Rate  of Capital  with Respt  to Tax Instruments:  The tax sensitivity
of rental rate of capital  is quite inelastic  with the single  exception  of its elasticity  with respect
to corporate  tax rate in Mexico  which is unitary  (see  Table SI).  In Mexico,  the rental rate of
capital  is most sensitive  to corporate  tax changes  and relatively  less to accelerated  depreciations
and investment  tax credits.  In  Pakistan, the sensitivity  ranking of  three instruments  is
completely  reversed  and investment  tax credit  changes  have  the greatest  influence  on the rental
rate of capital.  In Tlrkey,  the rental rate is more responsive  to changes in investment
allowances  than accelerated  capital  consumption  allowances  (CCAs)  or the corporate  tax rate
reductions.
Table  SI
Elasticity  of Rental  Rate  of Capital  with Respect  to Tax Measures
Mexico  (1983)  -0.409  - -0.635  1.021
Pakistan  (1984)  -0.386  - -0.225  0.035
Turkey  (1985)  - -0.341  -0.099  0.101- 53  -
On the Tax Sensitivity  of the Capital  Stock: The capital  stock  exhibits  sensitivity  to tax changes
but this sensitivity  varies by tax measure,  by industry  and by the adjustment  period. Table  S2
provides  comparative  evidence  on the tax sensitivity  of the capital stock by industry,  by tax
measure, and by adjustment  period.  For Mexico, elasticity  estimates  range from -0.014 to
-0.043 for corporate  tax changes;  from 0.009 to 0.027 for CCAs;  and from 0.006  to 0.017 for
changes  in investment  tax credits. For Palistani industries,  the responsiveness  of capital  stock
to changes  in corporate  income  tax is quite small  - elasticity  estimates  range from 0.0002 to
-0.006; for investment  tax credit elasticity  estimates  range from 0.002 to 0.029;  and finally  for
capital  cost  allowances  between  0.001  and 0.017. The  last two  sets of elasticities  are compatable
with  the ones  obtained  for the  Mexican  industries.  For Turkish  industries,  changes  in investment
allowances  matter more for the effects on capital formation than alternate tax measures.
Specifically,  elasticity  estimates  range from  0.013 to 0.052 with respect to changes in the
investment  incentive  allowance;  from 0.004  and  0.015  with  respect  to changes  in the capital  cost
allowances;  and from -0.004 to -0.015  with respect  to changes  in the corporate  income  tax.
On Benefit-Cost  Ratios:  The model results suggest  that tax policy affected production  and
irk  iestment  and further that some  tax incentives  were more effective  than others in investment
stimulation  per government  revenue  loss (see Table S3).  Among the incendves measures
examined, investment  allowances  proved to be a  cost-effective  instrument  for investment
promotion  only to Turkish  industries;  and investment  tax credits  and accelerated  depreciation
provisions  had a mixed success while corporate tax reductions  met with dismal failure in
promoting  investment  in a cost-effective  manner  in all cases  for all countries. In terms of their-54  -
T"  S2
TaI Samiivilty  of Capial Stock
_  S  -,  AW  . _  K  ~~, 
-~~~~~i-~  ~~.
MEXICO  (1983)
Dctcrgeia  .012  .016  .017  - - .019  .024  .027  .031  .039  .043
Other  chemaical  .006  .007  .008  - .009  .012  .013  -.014  -.019  -.021
PAKISTAN  (1914)
AppaDe  .004  .001  .029  - .002  .005  .017  -.0004  -.000  -.003
LAherd  i  .002  .003  .006  - - - .001  .002  .004  -.000  -.000  -.006
TURKEY  (1915)
Elecrical  Mach.  - - - .013  .04  .034  .004  .006  .009  -.004  -.006  -.009
Noa-electrical  Mach.  - .021  .033  .032  .006  .009  .015  -.006  -.009  -.015
Tansport  Equipment  - .020  .032  .051  .006  .009  .015  -.006  -.009  -.015- 55 -
Table S3
Investment  Expenditures  per Unit Value  of Lost Tax Revenue
Imoact
Short Run  Intermediate  Long
Tax Instrument  Run  RunRun
Investment  Tax Credit
Mexico:  Detergents  Industries  0.44  0.51  0.S4
Mexico:  Other Chemical  Industries  0.26  0.32  0.34
Pakistan:  Apparel  Industries  0.28  0.71  2.50
Pakistan:  Leather  Industries  0.11  0.28  2.54
Accelerated  Capital  Consumption  Allowances
Mexico:  Detergents  Industries  0.32  0.38  0.40
Mexico:  Other Chemicals  Industries  0.19  0.24  0.25
Pakistan:  Apparel  Industries  0.23  0.59  2.10
Pakistan:  Leather  Industries  0.09  0.23  2.13
Turkey:  Electrical  Machinery  industries  0.38  0.68  1.45
Turkey:  Non-Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.81  1.33  2.34
Turkey:  Transport  Industries  0.94  1.44  2.25
Corporate  Income  Tax Rate  Reductions
Mexico:  Detergents  Industries  0.03  0.04  0.05
Mexico:  Other  Chemicals  Industries  0.01  0.01  0.01
Paidstan:  Apparel  Industries  0.001  0.0002  0.007
Paldstan:  Leather  Industries  0.00  0.00  0.00
Turkey:  Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.20  0.21  0.28
Turkey:  Non-Elctrical Machinery  Industries  0.07  0.11  0.19
Turkey:  Transport  .ndustries  0.03  0.06  0.10
Investmene  Allowance
Turkey:  Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.40  0.72  1.54
Turkey:  Non-Electrical  Machinery  Industries  0.86  1.42  2.49
Turkey:  Transport  Equipment  Industries  1.00  1.54  2.40-56  -
long-run  impacts, investmnent  tax credits  were cost-effective  in two of the four industries  studied.
Accelerated capital consumption allowances also registered a similar performance and had
incremental benefit-cost  ratio exceeding  one in the long run for five out of seven industries
studied.  Corporate tax rate reductions stimulated investments  but resulted in revenue losses
exceeding  this stimulative  impact  in all cases and in all runs considered  in this study. Note that
corporate tax rate reductions apply to a larger base of pre-tax profits than the smaller base of
current investments  relevant  for investmnent  tax credits. The long run cost-effectiveness  of these
incentives,  except corporate  tax rate reductions  which  proved cost-ineffective  in all cases, vares
by country. In Turkey, investment  allowances  and capital consumption  allowances  were cost-
effective. In Mexico, both investrnent  tax credit and accelerated  capital  consumption  allowances
were not cost-effective.  In contrast, in Pakistan, both the investnent tax credit and accelerated
capital  consumption  allowances  were cost-effective.  In the intermediate  run, defined  as tax policy
impact after one year,  only the investmnent  allowances and accelerated  capital consumption
allowances  available to Turkish industries  proved cost-effective.
In  conclusion, selective tax  incentives such as  investment tax  credits,  investment
allowances  and accelerated  capital  consumption  allowances  are more  cost-effective  in promoting
investment than more general tax incentives  such as corporate tax rate reductions.  In order to
make selective  tax incentives  more effective,  investment  tax credits  must be refundable  and carry
forward of investment and depreciation  allowances  be permitted. If stimulation  of investment
expenditure  is the sole objective  of tax policy, corporate  tax rate reduction  is not a cost-effective
instrument  to achieve this objective.- 57  -
Enldootes
1.  The model can be readily generalized  to include multiple  outputs.  The production
function  is also  assumed  to be twice  continuously  differentiable,  and quasi-concave  in the
inputs  and net investments.
2.  The issue of capital  utilization  is not addressed  in this model. The problem  of costly
capital  utilization  implies  that  depreciation  rates  depend  on prices, technology  and market
structure. Hence  the use of existing  measures  of capital  stocks  would  be inappropriate
because  service  lives are assumed  to be independent  of prices and technology. Costly
capital  utilization  implies  that capital  stock measurement  and technology  determination
must be modelled simultaneously. This is an interesting, complex, but secondary
problem  to determining  the effects  of tax policy on output  supply  and input demand.
3.  We abstract  from  introducing  investment  tax allowances.  The model  can  be modified  to
include  them along  with capital  cost allowances.
4.  This assumption  is the Mortigliani-Miller  hypothesis.  It is also  possible  that with market
imperfections  firms  can  influence  the rate of return  on their  financial  capital  (see  Steigum
[1983]  and Bernstein  and Nadiri [1986]  for dynamic  models  in this context).
5.  The formula  for the after tax purchase  prices  of the capital  stocks  can be simplified.  If
the discount  rates are not expected  to change  then
Q,  j  qgs  (1 -V,,-(i  u+,.(l  -T 1,v 1,)d1,)/(1  + p)').  If, inaddition, thetaxrates
t-0
and
credits  are not expected  to change  then Q  - q4(l - v, - u,(l - 40v,  ( S  d,  / (1 +
-t-O
The latter is the more standard  formula  and is a special  case of the after tax purchase
price formula  used in the model (see  Hall and Jorgenson  [1967, 1969]  and Arrow and
Kurz (1970)).
6.  The inverse  price elasticity  and the conjectural  elasticity  are not assumed  to be constant.
Equation  (12.1) contains  their equilibrium  magnitudes.  The production  function  is also
part of the first order conditions.  The second order conditions  are assumed to be
satisfied.  The symbol  V represents  the gradient  vector.
7.  Recall that (<Oaide>o  so the last set of terms on the right side of equation (14),
including  the minus  sign  is positive.
8.  The additional  revenue  and thereby  profit arising from oligopoly  power does not vary
when it is evaluated at the equilibrium point. Thus the term affects the calculation of
variable  profit  but does  not affect  the first  order  conditions  characterizing  an equilibrium
As a consequence  the expression  can be ignored  when  defining  shadow  variable  prof'- 58  -
9.  The function  is also twice  continuously  differentiable,  homogeneous  of degree  one and
convex  in after tax prices, and concave  in the capital  inputs and net inventment  levels.
10.  It is also  assumed  that the tansversality  conditions  are satisfied.  The symbol  0. signifies
a m dimensional  vector of zeros.
11.  Since  depreciation  rates for the sample  industries  are not available,  Jorgenson  and Yun
(1991)  estimates  for U.S. industries  were used. The depreciation  rate for non-residential
structures  (0.025)  was calculated  as an average  of the depreciation  rates  on various  types
of industrial  structures. Inclusion  of other  types  of buildings  and structures  did not alter
the above  epron  rate significantly. The depreciation  rate for producer  durable
equipment  (0.10) was calculated  as an average  of the depreciation  rates on a number  of
electrical,  non-electrical  and transportation  machinery  and equipment  categories.
Please  note that while  Various  studies  use a range  of depreciation  rates, these  are similar
to the rates assumed  here.  For example,  Epstein  and Yatchew  (1985)  use a figure  of
0.107 and Epstein  and Denny  (1983)  use a range between  0.102 and 0.  111.
12.  See endnote  No. 11.
13.  See endnote  No. 11.- 59 -
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